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Because of its tremendous temporal and spatial scope, climate change poses profound regulatory issues. 
Significant transboundary effects and spatially differentiated effects make it highly desirable that 
international regulatory mechanisms are utilised in order to arrive at effective mitigation and adaptation 
solutions. Yet, the different spaces that states occupy in terms of causation and effect makes agreement on 
what must be regulated through international mechanisms and indeed how to regulate such subject matter. 
Consequently, this paper proposes that legitimacy needs to be considered one of the core concerns of 
international climate change regulation and governance. The aim of this paper is to clarify the role of the 
concept of legitimacy in international climate change regulation, and to set forth a specific discursive 
approach aimed at identifying legitimacy-enhancing design features for internationally regulating climate 
change.  
 
I The problem of regulation in climate change: Spatial and temporal limitations 
 
International climate change regulation poses some fundamental legitimacy issues. This is principally 
because the spatial and temporal challenges thrown up by rising global temperature do not lend 
themselves to easy regulation for several reasons.1 Firstly, although atmospheric concentration of 
greenhouse gases around the globe is uniform, the impact of such concentration is not identical across the 
world.2 Consequently, different regions around the world will not experience the same temperature increase 
and the usual references to averages in reports mask fact that some places will suffer greater increases. 
Additionally, governments’ public provision in services such as health, water, food and others are highly 
dependent on geographic location. Consequently, coping with climate change impacts will depend on the 
nations in which citizens find themselves. For example, the ability of the government of Malawi to provision 
these public services is not the same as that of the government of Malaysia.3 Again, location will drive the 
consequences of temperature increases across the globe. For example, temperature increases in places 
where water already scarce will lead to drought but not so much where water is already abundant. 
Similarly, the impact of increases in the ocean level will be greater in low lying islands where a small 
increase in ocean level will obliterate coastal communities, if not submerge entire islands. One might 
contrast this with communities in higher latitudes, for whom higher temperatures might translate to a longer 
growing season and therefore increased agricultural production.4 The point is that although all parts of the 
world can contribute to climate change, they will not suffer the consequences to the same degree and 
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indeed not at the same time. Indeed the painful paradox about human-induced climate change is that 
societies that have contributed most to the problem, are unlikely to suffer the worst of the consequences.5 
Consequently, the challenge that this poses at the international level is how to regulate in a way that is 
acceptable to all states given the differentiated and in some cases very delayed effects of climate change.6 
 
II Regulatory transitions in favour of climate change mitigation and adaptation 
 
The collective regulation of climate change requires significant trade-offs between and by states. Although 
there are, at the international level, a significant number of policy and regulatory interventions designed to 
mitigate climate change, it is often not immediately apparent how the myriad policies are integrated and 
connected to aggregate targets. There is a particular need for clear and credible policies that will contribute 
to aggregate emissions caps set on the basis of the long term targets. However, because the 
implementation of climate change policies and regulations requires fundamental changes in the long-
established repertoires of nations and their citizens; it is critical that such interventions enjoy a significant 
level of legitimacy if they are to succeed.7 This paper contributes to the debate about governance for 
climate change, addressing in particular the role of culture and legitimacy in the transition towards effective 
international regulation.  
 
In the context of climate change regulation, it is clear that given the spatial and temporal challenges 
outlined earlier, transitions to new effective regimes will likely be contested since the repertoires that 
currently define progress and development enjoy a high degree of acceptance. Transitions that are seen as 
curbing such a worldview will therefore struggle to gain acceptance. In addition to that, given the incidence 
of impacts of rising temperatures, it is almost unavoidable that those who will be asked to contribute more, 
will not be affected directly by the consequences of climate change, although the chain of causation will 
likely lead to them.  
 
Studies from the technological industries give us a good overview of the difficulties in trying to establish 
transitions within particularly well-settled systems.8 For example, the car transport system, is partly 
stabilised by high mobility lifestyles and cultural meanings that associate cars with freedom, individuality, 
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adventure, and status. The literature on path dependence also recognises ‘car culture’ as one of the lock-in 
mechanisms for the transport system. Existing participants within this system are stabilised by ‘webs of 
interdependent relationships with buyers, suppliers, and financial backers…and patterns of culture, norms 
and ideology’.9 Another example from technological transitions may be garnered from innovations in coal 
burning systems in the West. For a long time, smoke was accepted as unavoidable nuisance of burning 
coal in domestic stoves. However, anti-smoke campaigns in the late 19th century coupled with strong 
advocacy from doctors and urban reformers, motivated the articulation of new perceptions of smoke as 
silent killer, which in turn stimulated smoke regulations and innovations in coal burning equipment.10 It is 
clear, therefore, that in attempting to replace systems that enjoy considerable lock-in, it is almost always 
necessary to deconstruct existing cultural meanings.11 This is true of technological systems. It is also true 
of regulatory systems. 
 
Transitions thinking is also relevant with regard to radical breaks with the past, which usually suffer from the 
'liability of newness'.12 This is because the new regimes are likely to be perceived as strange and unfamiliar 
with regard to established cognitive categories, or as inappropriate with regard to behavioural norms.13 
Again, a good illustration may be sourced from technological studies. Du Gay outlines the case of the 
Walkman personal stereo, which when first introduced was considered ‘out of place’.14 Not only was the 
design of the device unfamiliar but it also failed to fit existing conceptual categories, combining as it did two 
paradigms: the pursuit of private pleasure (listening to one’s own music) within the public realm. The mixing 
of paradigms spawned some spirited discourse about the social effects of personal stereos: visionary 
voices welcomed individual choice and freedom, while status-quo advocates saw the personal stereo as 
destroyer of public life and community values. There were attempts to suppress personal stereos in public 
life, e.g. ban it from the London Underground.15 Over time, however, personal music systems have become 
an accepted, and some would argue an essential, part of life. 
 
These examples and considerations suggest that ‘culture’ is relevant at different levels of adaptive 
transitions, something that is explicitly acknowledged in multi-level perspective on change.16 However, in 
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the context of climate change regulation, despite the acknowledgement that culture is important, the 
literature on regulatory transitions within this domain have not systematically analysed the dynamics of 
culture and the mechanisms through which it exerts influence. The article aims to address this problem in 
two steps. Because ‘culture’ is a diffuse concept with multiple meanings, the first step is to articulate my 
position within the broader social science approaches that deal with culture and amplify the element of 
change. The second step is to conceptualise the relationship between this view of culture and regulatory 
transitions on climate change and thereby outline a discursive framework for systematically introducing 
legitimacy considerations within such transitions.  
 
III Culture and the omnipresence of change 
 
Culture is the cumulative creation of human beings ‘which transforms individuals into organised groups and 
gives these groups an almost indefinite continuity.17 An-Naim suggests that we use the term culture in what 
he calls ‘its widest meaning’  denoting ‘the totality of values, institutions and forms of behaviour transmitted 
within a society, as well as the material goods produced by men [and women] …This wide concept of 
culture covers Weltanschaung [worldview], ideologies and cognitive behaviour.’18 With this broad definition 
of culture, An-Naim does not mean to suggest that culture is everything but rather that ‘there is a cultural 
dimension to every aspect of human activity’.19 Culture is therefore a source of the individual and 
communal worldview. It provides both the individual and the community with the values and interests to be 
pursued in life, as well as the legitimate means of pursuing them. It stipulates the norms and values that 
contribute to people’s perception of their self-interest and the goals and methods of individual and collective 
struggles for power within a society and between societies.  As such, culture is a primary force in the 
socialisation of the individual and a major determinant of the consciousness and experience of the 
community. As Geertz  observes, without culture or enculturation:20 
 
[H]uman beings would be unworkable monstrosities with very few useful instincts, fewer recognisable sentiments, and 
no intellect; mental basket cases. As our central nervous system…grew up in great part in interaction with culture, it is 
incapable of directing our behaviour or organising our experience without the guidance provided by systems of 
significant symbols…Such symbols are thus not mere expressions, instrumentalities or correlates of our biological, 
psychological and social existence, they are prerequisites of it. 
 
Amplifying this understanding of the role of culture as a system of symbols, Geertz defines culture as 
‘historically transmitted patterns of meaning, embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions 
expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their 
knowledge about and attitudes towards life.  
 
Lindholm explains these observations further by pointing out that in any social group there are certain 
routines of practice which include skills, competencies, the exercise of rules or formulation of frameworks, 
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opinions, aspirations, sensibilities, roles or institutions.21 These routines are taken for granted and shared 
as a matter of course. Newcomers to the group have no viable alternative but to acquire those routines of 
practice if they are to have access to the activities and experiences that define social practice. As historical 
social structures, traditions are shared and unquestioned routines which are reproduced by the individuals 
in a given generation, passed on to newcomers who are included in the group as they are born or become 
assimilated into the group. Thus, culture is learned and shared behaviour which helps systematise the way 
people go about their lives.22 Culture establishes a set pattern of belief and assumptions by means of which 
everyone can project their perceptions and expectations onto other people without thinking about it. This in 
turn provides consistency, predictability and stability by simplifying social interaction. 
 
Whilst this view of culture is fundamentally correct, it is vital to avoid conceptualising culture ‘as a static, 
homogenous, and bounded entity defined by its specific “traits”’.23 In this regard, Preis argues that cultures 
are not quantifiable things that sometimes happen to come into contact with each other.24 Instead, culture is 
at once a dynamic process and specific practice without discrete boundaries. She notes:25 
 
Although the classic vision of unique cultural patterns has proven merit, its limitations are seen today as serious 
indeed. Most importantly, this vision emphasises shared patterns at the expense of processes of change and internal 
inconsistencies, conflicts and contradictions. 
 
Lindholm concedes this point when he observes that social practices are reproduced and transformed only 
through the activities of individuals, and are suspended or discontinued when the upholders of a given 
tradition entertain viable alternatives to it. 26 His main point in this regard is that traditions are reproduced 
only through intentional human agency and not as something that exists independently outside of the 
participants within a particular culture. 
 
Nyamu-Musembi lends her weight behind the importance of human agency and against a deterministic 
conception of culture. Drawing upon the findings of her research on women’s property rights in Kenya, she 
observes that ‘the dynamism reflected in the variation and flexibility that abound in actual social practice 
point to the fact that culture is not deterministic’. 27 In her view, human actors do possess the agency that 
enables them to act against established cultural expectations, and, therefore opening up the possibility of 
the departure from long accepted interpretations of culture. 
 
The above analysis points out one crucial characteristic of culture that is more often than not omitted in 
definitions and discussions concerning the concept. This aspect of culture highlights not only its resilience 
and endurance but also its permeability and flexibility. In this regard, it is important to note that all cultures 
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are ‘eclectic, dynamic, and subject to significant alteration over time. 28 They are susceptible to and do 
respond to influence by social, economic and political forces. Thus culture is neither a monolithic nor 
unchanging set of practices. In fact, according to An-Naim, one of the apparent paradoxes of culture is the 
way it combines stability with dynamic continuous change.29 As Herskovitz correctly observes,  ‘culture is 
flexible and holds many possibilities of choice within its framework…[T]o recognize the values held by a 
given people [at a particular period] in no way implies that these values are a constant factor in the lives of 
succeeding generations of the same group’.30 
 
Thus culture and cultural practices are not immutable but rather are inherently responsive to new ideas and 
ways of doing things suggested by external influences or required by internal needs. Similarly, Hitchcock 
aptly captures the shifting yet very settled nature of culture when he posits that: 31 
 
Culture, shared meanings, practices, and symbols that constitute the human world, does not present itself neutrally or 
with one voice. It is always multi-vocal and over-determined, and both the observers and the observed are always 
enmeshed in it…There is no privileged position, no absolute perspective, no final recounting.’ 
 
Viewed from this perspective, it is clear that international discourse on the appropriate interventions to 
combat climate change is but a species of cultural interaction. Consequently, establishing international 
approaches to solving the problem as agreed by states will bring in the dynamics of change described 
above. It is clear that even though attempting to establish regulatory frameworks for addressing the 
problem of climate change will meet significant challenges, given the spatial and temporal challenges 
raised by climate change, there is significant scope for establishing innovative and ultimately effective 
solutions at the international level. Despite cultural factors that support regulatory frameworks amenable to 
climate change-inducing behaviour within different states, there are immense possibilities for sea-changes 
even amongst the community of states for tackling such. Policy makers addressing the issue must grasp 
the opportunities offered by the idea of change within cultural constructs and consider interventions which 
aim to displace the legitimacy of the existing narratives with new perspectives that enjoy greater cultural 
legitimacy.  
 
IV Cultural legitimacy and international regulation 
 
While it has been acknowledged that legitimacy is an essential aspect of any potential governance scheme 
directed at regulating climate change,32 conceptual clarity has so far been lacking in relation to the manner 
in which the concept can be introduced into transitions in climate change regulation. Consequently, in this 
section I focus on the concept of legitimacy and outline a discursive framework for achieving its systematic 
introduction towards efforts in international climate change regulation. 
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Cultural legitimacy denotes the quality of being in conformity with the accepted principles or rules and 
standards of a particular culture. The defining characteristic of cultural legitimacy is the authority and 
reverence derived from internal validity.33 A culturally legitimate norm, rule or value is respected and 
observed by members of the particular community, presumably because it is assumed to bring benefits 
(whether real or imagined, tangible or intangible) to the members of that particular community. The 
corollary of this is that a rule or norm which does not command adequate legitimacy will not enjoy sufficient 
observance or support. Such a rule is more likely to be breached than observed. Thus, at the most basic 
level, a social or political order can be described as legitimate when its subjects consider its rules to be 
appropriate and binding. That is they accept the authoritative allocation of values occurring within it, which 
may be costly for them, even in the absence of sanctioning mechanisms.  
 
In the context of international climate change regulation, the key question is how legitimacy-enhancing 
attributes can be imbued within regulatory interventions right from the outset so that their impact is 
immediate. In order to do this, it is essential to consider different elements of legitimacy in so far as they 
pertain to international regulation. Consequently, in the remainder of this section, I introduce three 
dimensions of the concept in reference to which comprehensive frameworks of legitimate regulation may be 
developed. These three dimensions include input, throughput, and output legitimacy.34  
 
Input legitimacy refers to the notion that those being ruled should have something to say in the policy-
making process. In a representative democracy, input is secured through the right to vote and assures the 
accountability of decision-makers to those whom they represent. Different societal interests are thus 
represented by those who were elected to do so. In a direct democracy, input is not mediated through 
representation but instead occurs through the direct participation of those governed. In settings beyond the 
nation-state it is very difficult to secure input legitimacy. Technically, decision-makers at the international 
level are accountable to those who elected them as their representatives in the context of national 
elections. However, the national discourse in the run-up to national elections tends to focus on national 
issues. There is thus a lack of information on the international issues policymakers will have to deal with 
when in office.  Additionally, two other problems arise in the context of input-legitimacy at the international 
level. Firstly, the absence of strong transnational interest representation leads to decision-making that is 
not informed by the interests of those affected. Secondly, and most significantly in regard to global issues 
such as consciously altering the climate, those affected by a decision are often not represented in the 
decision-making process. The latter can be referred to as lack of input-congruency35 since the group of 
people who are represented in the decision-making process is not congruent with the group of people who 
are affected by political outcomes. 
 
Throughput legitimacy refers to the quality of the process by which rules are determined. To ensure 
throughput legitimacy, it is important that it is clear who is responsible for which decisions. Transparency is 
thus a central feature of a legitimate decision-making process. From a democratic theory perspective, a 
legitimate decision-making process also cannot simply rely on majority voting, but must involve deliberative 
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processes in which individual interests are subjected to public scrutiny.36 Thus, in order to secure 
throughput legitimacy, it is essential that at the international level decisions are not simply made through 
diplomatic bargaining, but via a process of deliberative argumentation in which individual interests are 
scrutinised and debated in regard to their justifiability. 
 
Output legitimacy refers to the substantial quality of rules themselves. This is an important aspect of the 
concept of legitimacy since even a system which follows a legitimate process in its decision-making but 
produces unacceptable outcomes must be considered illegitimate. Its subjects will not voluntarily comply 
with its rules. Similarly as with input legitimacy, a deficiency in output legitimacy occurs when there is no 
congruency between the reach of a rule and the extent of the relevant social context to which it applies.37 
The denationalisation of social contexts, i.e. the increase in externalities that operate across borders 
(transboundary effects), has led to a lack of output-congruency in the nation-state; this reminds us that 
international institutions are an (albeit imperfect) response to a deficit in legitimacy, and not its origin. In 
terms of output-congruency with regard to transnational issues, international institutions are an 
improvement to the territorially-bound reach of decisions made in nation-states. Nonetheless, it must be 
noted that most international institutions from the viewpoint of output-congruency are still insufficient, while 
at the same time overstepping the boundaries of legitimate decision-making with regard to input 
congruency. Shortly put, international institutions do not do enough in terms of output, but what they do is 
already too much to be justified in terms of input. 
 
It is clear, therefore, that legitimacy is key to the proper functioning of interstate regulatory arrangements.38 
However, ensuring that legitimacy is introduced at all stages of the regulatory process is a considerable 
challenge. Given the regionally differentiated effects of climate change, there is likely to be significant 
disagreement between states on the desirability of the regulatory choices made to tackle the problem. 
Deliberate strategies that allow legitimacy-enhancing features to be designed into climate change 
regulatory frameworks at the input stage and throughput stages are one way of ensuring efficacy and 
acceptance of regulatory interventions. Additionally, systems that have measurable attributes to assess the 
outputs are also likely to be more resilient. In order to avoid tensions and conflict and to ensure good 
governance between different states, legitimate regulatory schemes at all governance levels are needed. 
 
V Cultural legitimacy and regulatory transitions in favour of climate change mitigation 
 
Within international climate change regulation, actors try to confer legitimacy to their actions and 
innovations by linking their discourses to broad but diffuse ideographs.39 These cultural actions are situated 
both internationally as well as at the local level. Institutional theory suggests that the legitimacy of existing 
regimes depends on conformity to broader cognitive institutions (ideologies, generalised belief systems, 
societal discourses), normative institutions (values, role expectations, standards of acceptability) and 
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regulatory institutions (laws, regulations).40 From a substantive viewpoint, this legitimacy is continuously 
reproduced and defended against challenges.  
 
Regime actors engage in debates and contestation to articulate, reproduce, and adjust the discourses that 
provide meaning and legitimacy for particular regulatory issues. Radical novelties initially have low 
legitimacy, because they suffer from the ‘liability of newness’ and are being perceived as strange, weird, or 
inappropriate.41 Consequently, in the early phase of transitions, the enhancement of cultural legitimacy is 
therefore a crucial process. Again, technological studies offer great examples relating to the uneven and 
uncertain nature of transitions: radical innovations are initially characterised by pervasive uncertainty, e.g. 
about, user requirements, technical performance, price and resilience. It is therefore difficult to make 
reliable cost-benefit calculations that underpin rational decision-making. Early investments, ventures, are 
therefore, at least partly, an act of faith that involves beliefs and feelings. Similarly,  new regulatory systems 
need resources from their environment, and, in the end, the motivating factor for external actors to give 
such resources is their belief or feeling that the framework is indeed competent, efficient, effective, worthy, 
appropriate, and/or needed. Perceived legitimacy provides a basis for decision-making that is different from 
means-ends rationality.42 Cultural legitimacy thus has positive effects on attracting attention, resources and 
support from relevant external actors.43 Investments, support and acceptance, in turn, help regulatory 
transitions gather momentum in the early phases of transitions.  
 
Because the literature already recognises the effects of cultural legitimacy, in this, the remainder, of the 
paper, I specifically focus on the origins and creation of legitimacy, particularly with regard to transitions in 
climate change regulation and attempt to link these perspectives with the processual and qualitative ideas 
of input, throughtput and output legitimacy.  
 
The cultural legitimacy of efficacious climate change regulatory frameworks is the outcome of discursive 
struggles between those who oppose drastic changes to emissions pathways (for whatever their strategic 
reasons) and those champion major redrawing of emissions and consumptive patterns to address climate 
change. The proponents articulate promises, expectations, and visions that highlight the advantages of 
particular innovations, how they will solve particular climate change problems and avert the externalities of 
rising global temperatures (e.g. creation of new opportunities; development of newer, cleaner technologies-
which can only be a good thing, it is argued. The opponents tend to highlight disadvantages, risks, and 
possible negative side-effects (e.g. limitations in productivity; reduction in competitiveness, etc).  From a 
practical viewpoint, both discourses struggle with each other; actors develop arguments and 
counterarguments in response to each other and changing public perceptions. Climate change struggles 
are thus played out as ‘regulatory dramas’ on the public stage with actors aiming to influence the 
perceptions and appreciations of relevant ‘audiences’ (who provide resources, support, acceptance etc.).44 
 
Thus, insights into institutional dynamics of decision making also show that all environmental decisions 
implicitly or explicitly involve questions, as well as trade-offs, regarding economic efficiency, environmental 
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effectiveness, equity and political legitimacy.45 All environmental decisions produce distinct sets of 
institutional forms with different outcomes, different degrees of uncertainty, and different trade-offs for each 
particular alternative and derived outcome. Hence, international environmental decision making is likely to 
involve a plurality of stakeholders with divergent views over these implementation alternatives and 
outcomes. Stakeholders’ competing views are likely to be a product of their diverse socio-cultural contexts 
and their interests. This highlights the importance of being sensitive to this pluralism in the design and 
implementation of environmental decisions. Designing input, throughput and output legitimacy into any 
international regulatory responses is therefore one way of ensuring the efficacy of international 
interventions. Discourses that score higher on more of these aspects of legitimacy, have more strength, 
produce more legitimacy, and thus generate more effects on external actors who provide resources, 
support and protection. They have more foundation in terms of their legitimacy and are more likely to result 
in lasting transitions. By deliberately adopting strategies that increase the incidence of legitimacy enhancing 
features within input, throughput and output legitimacy, it is likely that the regulatory transitions to a more 
credible climate change regime will emerge. 
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